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I
Those of  us who conduct independent research are expected to present
findings at professional meetings and publish results in peer-reviewed journals.
Over the last twenty-five years, this basic norm of the scientific community has
provided opportunities for parties in litigation to use these findings to expand
or limit potential damage claims.1  When such situations emerge, researchers
can expect to have their research activities, data, and their professional integ-
rity challenged.  These challenges occur even if such claims are unwarranted by
the paradigmatic standards of the researchers’ discipline.2  The targeted re-
searcher often becomes an “unwilling informant” when he or she receives a
subpoena that requests all records corresponding to the relevant research.  Par-
ties in litigation purposefully use broad subpoenas in an attempt to gather any
and all information that can be repeatedly challenged by a “litigation-centered
review” rather than a “discipline-centered review.”3
Upon reviewing the articles in this volume of Law and Contemporary
Problems, I was impressed by the range of issues covered, the comprehensive-
ness and detail provided, and the importance of this information for research-
ers who will find themselves in the role of  the “reluctant expert” in the future.
Although I had previously served as an expert witness for the court and for
plaintiffs in several toxic tort cases, when, as an independent researcher, I re-
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1. Michael R. Edelstein, Psychosocial Impacts on Trial: The Case of Hazardous Waste Disposal,
in PSYCHOSOCIAL EFFECTS OF HAZARDOUS TOXIC WASTE DISPOSAL ON COMMUNITIES 153, 157-59
(Dennis Peck ed., 1989).  This fact is especially true for those scientists who independently study highly
litigious issues, such as technological disasters, i.e., human-caused events that result in massive envi-
ronmental contamination.  Id.; see also Sheila Jasanoff, Research Subpoenas and the Sociology of
Knowledge, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (Summer 1996) (discussing the similar notion of
“construction” and “deconstruction” of evidence).
2. Richard A. Berk & Jerold Oppenheim, Doing Good Well: The Use of Quantitative Social Sci-
ence Data in Advocacy Proceedings, 1 L. & POL’Y Q. 123, 137 (1979); see also Sheila Jasanoff, What
Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 77 JUDICATURE 77, 82 (1993); Jasanoff, supra
note 1.
3. Jasanoff, supra note 1, at 113-14.
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ceived an eight-page subpoena from attorneys representing the Exxon Corpo-
ration in the fall of 1992, I was unprepared for the lengthy court battle that was
to ensue.4  If this volume had been available at that time, it would have bene-
fited my attorney, my colleagues, and the respondents of my research study,
and it would have significantly reduced my personal distress-level, which lasted
for almost a year.
The focus of my contribution to this volume is limited to my involvement in
the ongoing Exxon Valdez litigation.  The Exxon Valdez disaster was the larg-
est and most ecologically destructive oil spill in North American history.5  Like
the case of Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,6 a pharmaceuticals products
liability action for injuries stemming from plaintiffs’ in utero exposure to the
drug DES,7 the litigation involved quickly became “high stakes” by all stan-
dards, and, at this writing, continues to be an extraordinary high-stakes money
game.8  Exxon settled with the government for $1.1 billion,9 and the civil case
resulted in jury awards to the plaintiffs totaling more than $5 billion.10  At pres-
ent, the civil awards are pending appeal and Exxon’s aggressive, “hardball” le-
gal strategy will ensure litigation well into the twenty-first century.11
Other accounts of my involvement in the Exxon litigation have misrepre-
sented my role.12  As an independent, third-party researcher, I directed the col-
lection of survey data related to the disaster in several small Alaskan communi-
ties from 1989 to 1992.  Unfortunately, my case has been confused with at least
one other case, which involves several anthropologists working for Impact As-
sessment, Inc., who conducted a survey for the plaintiffs one year after the
spill.13  I will discuss the articles in this volume against the backdrop of my per-
                                                          
4. I have discussed this litigation in detail elsewhere and draw extensively from these works for
my comments.  See J. Steven Picou, Sociology and Compelled Disclosure: Protecting Respondent Con-
fidentiality, 16 SOC. SPECTRUM 209 (1996) [hereinafter Sociology and Compelled Disclosure]; J. Steven
Picou, Toxins in the Environment, Damage to the Community: Sociology and the Toxic Tort, in
WITNESSING FOR SOCIOLOGY: SOCIOLOGISTS IN COURT 211, 219-22 (Pamela J. Jenkins & Steve
Kroll-Smith eds., 1996).
5. Robert B. B. Spies et al., The Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill on the Alaskan Coastal En-
vironment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL SYMPOSIUM 1, 11-13 (Stanley D. Rice
et al. eds., 1996).
6. 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984).
7. Id. at 557.
8. Barbara B. Crabb, Judicially Compelled Disclosure of Researchers’ Data: A Judge’s View, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9-14 (Summer 1996).
9. Ernest Piper, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Government Settlement and Restoration Activities, in
THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER: READINGS ON A MODERN SOCIAL PROBLEM 255, 258-60 (J. Steven
Picou et al. eds., 1997).
10. William B. Hirsch, Justice Delayed: Seven Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and No End
in Sight, in THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER: READINGS ON A MODERN SOCIAL PROBLEM 271, 271 (J.
Steven Picou et al. eds., 1997); see also Mike France, Corporate Litigation: Playing Hardball is One
Thing . . ., BUS. WK., July 1, 1996, at 32.
11. Hirsch, supra note 10, at 271, 289; France, supra note 10, at 32.
12. See, e.g., Steven McNabb, Social Research and Litigation: Good Intentions Versus Good Ethics,
54 HUMAN ORG. 331, 331-33 (1995); Marilee Enge, Scientist, Exxon Fight Over Data, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, May 26, 1993, at A1.
13. See Elizabeth C. Wiggins & Judith A. McKenna, Researchers’ Reactions to Compelled Disclo-
sure of Scientific Information, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 68 n.3 (Summer 1996).
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sonal experience in the Exxon Valdez litigation.
II
My research in Alaska was independently funded through the peer-review
process of the National Science Foundation, and, more importantly, the project
was a longitudinal study that lasted four years.  The longitudinal research de-
sign necessitated a detailed record of respondent identities for re-interviewing,
required constant field work and data management, and included specific
methodological procedures to protect respondent privacy.14
Respondents were selected by random procedures and guaranteed confi-
dentiality.  This guarantee was consistent with regulations set forth by the Na-
tional Science Foundation in their Principles for the Conduct of Research in the
Arctic15 and the American Sociological Association’s Code of Ethics.16  In addi-
tion to this written guarantee of privacy, respondents were given information
about methodological procedures that would be utilized in the research.  Spe-
cifically, they were told that immediately following the receipt of their final in-
terview, all personal identifiers, including names, addresses, and phone num-
bers, would be eliminated from the master data file and all hard copies would
be discarded.17
Although not designed as a social damage assessment, this study collected
data on spill-related stress-levels and patterns of social disruption.  Beginning
in 1989, my colleagues and I presented papers at professional meetings and, in
1992, published two peer-reviewed articles that detailed patterns of stress and
disruption between impacted and control communities.18  Unknown to me,
these papers and publications were referenced by the plaintiffs’ experts and at-
torneys.  Upon returning from Alaska in late September of 1992, I received a
civil subpoena from attorneys representing the Exxon Corporation, which
commanded that I produce and permit inspection of a litany of documents
deemed to be in my possession.19
Upon receipt of the subpoena, I immediately contacted the attorney of the
University of South Alabama.  After numerous meetings, the university filed a
protective order on my behalf, which attempted to set a cooperative tone for
the release of information.20  An exception to this cooperation was noted for
                                                          
14. See Michael Traynor, Countering the Excessive Subpoena for Scholarly Research, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 120-35 (Summer 1996).
15. Nat’l Science Foundation, Principles for the Conduct of Research in the Arctic, 4 ARCTIC
RESEARCH FOR THE UNITED STATES 110, 110-11 (1990).
16. AM. SOCIOLOGICAL ASS’N, CODE OF  ETHICS, I A, B (1982).
17. See Traynor, supra note 14, at 124-25.
18. See J. Steven Picou et al., Stress and Disruption in an Alaskan Fishing Community: Initial and
Continuing Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 6 INDUS. CRISIS Q. 235 (1992).
19. My subpoena is reproduced in its entirety in Appendix A of Picou, Sociology and Compelled
Disclosure, supra note 4, at 231-36.  Other researchers involved in the Exxon Valdez litigation received
similarly broad subpoenas.  For example, compare McNabb’s subpoena reproduced in McNabb, supra
note 12, at 333.
20. Traynor, supra note 14, at 131-34.
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the protection of survey data and respondent confidentiality.21  With subpoena
in hand, I had to refocus my research efforts to protecting the respondent iden-
tifiers, to the extent legally possible, from those who would use the information
to advance a particular legal claim.  Although the protective order was granted
on October 14, 1992,22 the court reserved the right to reconsider the order as
well as to modify it.23
The following month I was deposed by an Exxon attorney.  At that time, all
project financial records, files, correspondence, papers, and other materials
were turned over to Exxon.  The production and copying of the massive
amount of material that had accumulated over four years was an arduous task
for my staff and myself.  There was no reimbursement for labor and technical
costs; however, there was also no release of data files or data records at that
time because of the standing protective order.
The next four months were frantic and extremely stressful for me.
Throughout this time, Exxon sought access to the data by negotiating directly
with the university attorney and through motions and affidavits offered to the
court by their attorneys and experts.  Various news accounts of my litigation
were published in Alaska newspapers, and rumors about my case reached me
from the communities I studied.  Several respondents expressed fear and con-
cern regarding the release of the data, respondent identifiers, and information
on their involvement in the Exxon litigation.  The ethical priority of protecting
respondent confidentiality became my obsession when a “concerned” respon-
dent committed suicide.24
Upon hearing of this incident, I more clearly realized the vulnerable posi-
tion that respondents occupy in high stakes litigation.  Victims of technological
disasters such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill experience long periods of chronic
stress making them even more vulnerable as continuing research respondents
during protracted litigation.25  My resolve to protect the data and the identities
of the respondents was stronger than ever while the litigation activities con-
sumed all of my attention.
Numerous motions offered by Exxon’s attorneys and experts argued that I
was uncooperative and had become “more and more restrictive” in my negotia-
tions and that my timetable for the release of information “would render in-
formation useless” to Exxon.26  In short, they argued I was being “intractable,”
and because my research had been referenced by the plaintiffs’ experts, Exxon
                                                          
21. Motion for Protective Order, In re the Exxon Valdez Re: All Cases, Misc. 92-0072 RV-C (S.D.
Ala. Oct. 13, 1992).
22. Protective Order, id. (S.D. Ala. Oct. 14, 1992).
23. Id.
24. Marilee Enge, Cordova Mourns Yet Another Loss: Suicide Touches Nerve Left Raw by Oil
Spill, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 17, 1993, at A1.
25. Andrew Baum & India Fleming, Implications of Psychological Research on Stress and Tech-
nological Accidents, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 665, 665-672 (1993).
26. Defendants’ Motion to Compel, In re the Exxon Valdez Re: All Cases, Misc. 92-0072 RV-C
(S.D. Ala. March 18, 1993).
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filed a motion to compel production of the data.27
The written responses to these claims prepared by the university attorney
and me emphasized and reaffirmed the importance of maintaining respondent
confidentiality and my rights as a researcher to unanalyzed raw data.  Several
leading cases were used to support the argument for protecting respondent con-
fidentiality, including Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc,28 a case giving the
requesting party some access to a university’s study registry, which was the only
centralized repository of information on a disease relevant to the litigation.
However, in Deitchman, the Seventh Circuit directed a lower court to issue a
subpoena that balanced the defendants’ urgent need for disclosure of the study
against the university’s privacy right in the registry.29  Our arguments support-
ing the nondisclosure of respondent data also rested on the case of Farnsworth
v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,30  in which a research center’s interest in maintaining
the confidentiality of its study participants’ identity was deemed to outweigh
countervailing discovery interests.31  Additionally, Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen32
was used in support of the proposition that forced production of research re-
sults that had not been subjected to peer review would both jeopardize the
study and unduly burden researchers.33  Oral arguments raising these issues
were presented by both parties during a hearing on May 23, 1993.
Approximately five weeks after the hearing, the court ruled on the case.  In
a manner similar to the Deitchman case, the ruling essentially constituted a
“split decision.”  Exxon’s motion to compel my release of the data was partially
granted and partially denied.  Nonetheless, this “split decision” was consistent
with the result in the cases discussed throughout this article.
The basis for the court’s ruling rested in the distinction made by the court
concerning specific data that had been used in the publication of a peer-
reviewed article (data collected in 1989 and 1990) and data that reflected on-
going research, which had not been subjected to any peer-review process (data
collected in 1991 and 1992).  As discussed by Wiggins and McKenna,34 as well as
O’Neil and Traynor,35 the portion of the ruling denying the motion to compel
disclosure recognized that the release of incomplete and unpublished data did
not have probative value and was inconsistent with the ethics and norms of the
scientific community.36
The portion of Exxon’s motion granted by the court recognized that for
                                                          
27. Id.
28. 740 F.2d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 1984).
29. Id. at 565-66.
30. 758 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985).
31. Id. at 1547.
32. 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982).
33. Id. at 1273.
34. Wiggins & McKenna, supra note 13, at 67, 86-88.
35. Robert M. O’Neil, A Researcher’s Privilege:  Does Any Hope Remain?, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 35, 43 (Summer 1996).
36. Order at 7-8 n. 3, In re the Exxon Valdez Re: All Cases, Misc. 92-0072 RV-C (S.D. Ala. July 1,
1993) (order).
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published research, access to “the underlying data must be made available to
others equally skilled and perceptive.”37  Thus, the data collected in 1989 and
1990 were turned over, in raw form, through a “computer dump” of existing
data records.  Although these data had been used to publish one article, a final
codebook was not available for the released information.  This fact was very
disconcerting to me, given that the data were not in a format that is customary
for collegial data sharing in the scientific community.38
Most important for the issue of respondent confidentiality, the portion of
the ruling granting the motion to compel was also governed by a protective or-
der entered on the same date.39  The protective order limited access to the 1989-
90 computer data to the defendants’ designated experts.  Hard copies were for
experts’ eyes only, and any reproduction of data was prohibited.40  All paper
documents were to be stamped “HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL PURSUANT
TO DR. J. STEVEN PICOU PROTECTIVE ORDER IN THE EXXON
VALDEZ OIL SPILL LITIGATION.”41  Defendants’ experts were required to
complete an agreement signifying their understanding of the confidentiality be-
fore gaining access to the material.42  The data were to be produced solely for
statistical analysis, and attempts to identify individuals listed on the computer
documents were prohibited.43
Immediately following this ruling, Exxon’s attorneys filed a motion to
amend the court order because it did not “distinguish between plaintiffs and
non-plaintiffs” for material that was to be turned over to Exxon.44  This request
was a direct challenge to respondent confidentiality and revealed numerous
contradictions in previous arguments maintained by Exxon’s attorneys.  The
ruling by the federal magistrate noted that Exxon’s motion simply “exceed[ed]
the scope of the original motion as well as the discovery needs identified by the
defendants.”45  This order and the prior ruling upheld the issue of respondent
confidentiality and reaffirmed a form of “researcher privilege” by denying ac-
cess to unpublished and incomplete data.  Indeed, like the Farnsworth case, no
disclosure of respondent identifiers occurred and the court specifically denied
any form of “deductive disclosure” by prohibiting the identification of indi-
                                                          
37. Deitchman, v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 1984).  See generally An-
drews v. Eli Lilly & Co., 97 F.R.D. 494 (N.D. Ill. 1983); In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 518 N.Y.S. 2d
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987); Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Mich. 1982).  See also Paul D. Car-
rington &  Traci L. Jones, Reluctant Experts, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 62 (Summer 1996).
38. See Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 3, In re the
Exxon Valdez Re: All Cases, Misc. 92-0072 RV-C. (S.D. Ala. 1993); Exxon’s Request for Further
Hearing with Respect to the Court’s Order of July 1, 1993, In re the Exxon Valdez Re: All Cases,
Misc. 92-0072 RV-C. (S.D. Ala. August 9, 1993).
39. Protective Order, In re the Exxon Valdez Re: All Cases, Misc. 92-0072 RV-C (S.D. Ala. July 1,
1993).
40. Id. at 3-4.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 4-5.
43. Id.
44. Motion to Amend Court Order, In re the Exxon Valdez Re: All Cases, Misc. 92-0072 RV-C
(S.D. Ala. July 2, 1993).
45. Order at 3, id. (S.D. Ala. July 9, 1993).
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viduals through a protective order.46  The premature disclosure of independent
scientific research was also prohibited; therefore, the “norms and values of the
scientific community” were upheld.47
III
It is apparent from this review and the articles in this volume that research-
ers take many risks when they become involved in studies deemed relevant to
“high stakes litigation.”  The risk of being subpoenaed involves many demands
on the researcher for which he or she may not be compensated.  In my case, I
was fortunate to have strong and continuing support from my university, de-
partment, counsel, colleagues, and family.  A review of similar cases indicates
that such support is rare for the university scholar.48  Furthermore, the time and
constant attention that is required to respond adequately to subpoenas in such
cases is underestimated by the courts.  The schedule of my research project was
permanently disrupted due to the constant need to respond to motions and af-
fidavits, which, in my opinion, repeatedly reflected inaccurate information and
irrelevant charges.  Nonetheless, as reaffirmed by Judge Crabb’s contribution
to this volume, the argument of “burdensomeness” may not be compelling to
the court when the requested data is deemed to have “significant probative
value.”49  Although in my opinion, references to my work by plaintiffs’ experts
were minimal, the court ruled otherwise.
The researcher also takes the risk of having his or her professional integrity,
research methodology, and personal ethics challenged through the
“deconstruction” of his or her work.50  In my case, this deconstruction began
with a comparison of the procedures used in the research design I employed
with a gold standard design used for conducting ideal experiments.  Obviously,
this tactic was exclusionary; that is, Exxon’s experts attempted to build a case
“to deny scientific status” to any results that expanded the range of damage
claims by plaintiffs.51  In short, “mindless deconstruction” of one’s research is a
very real risk to the researcher.52
Despite such unavoidable problems, researchers can successfully protect re-
spondent confidentiality and deny premature disclosure of research data by
utilizing methodological procedures designed to protect confidentiality and by
having good legal counsel.53  A review of the suggestions provided by Traynor
for countering the excessive subpoena reveals that we adhered to seven of them
                                                          
46. Protective Order, Exhibit A, In re the Exxon Valdez Re: All Cases, Misc. 92-0072 RV-C. (S.D.
Ala. July 1, 1993).
47. Carrington & Jones, supra note 37, at 61.
48. See Mario Brajuha & Lyle Hallowell, Legal Intrusion and the Politics of Field Work, 14
URBAN LIFE 454, 458-460 (1986); Rik Scarce, Scholarly Ethics and Courtroom Antics: Where Re-
searchers Stand in the Eyes of the Law, 26 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 87, 94-96 (1995).
49. Crabb, supra note 8, at 24.
50. See Jasanoff, supra note 1, at 98-100.
51. Id. at 114.
52. Id. at 98.
53. See generally Traynor, supra note 14.
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in the Exxon case.54  More specifically, we (1)identified the reasons for confi-
dentiality, (2) removed identifiers and safeguarded the data, (3) complied with
Institutional Review Board policy, (4) consulted counsel immediately upon re-
ceipt of the subpoena, (5) made timely service of written suggestions, (6)
moved to quash or modify the subpoena, and (7) sought and received an ade-
quate protective order.
These activities obviously enhanced our arguments to the court.  Fortu-
nately, future “reluctant experts” will have the benefit of the discussion in this
volume and specifically Traynor’s strategies for responding to subpoenas.  We
should also note the importance of obtaining federal confidentiality certificates
whenever research involves the mental health of respondents.55  This activity
provides important statutory protection for respondent confidentiality prior to
researching legally sensitive topics.56
To address what can be done to reduce the legal burdens of everyone in-
volved in “high stakes litigation,” the suggestions provided by Carrington and
Jones57 and Jasanoff58 should be given serious consideration.  By appointing in-
dependent experts, review panels, disinterested witnesses, or by ordering a
comprehensive damage assessment, the courts could reduce the economic ad-
vantage of parties in litigation, facilitate relatively quick settlements, eliminate
“repeat witnesses” and “hired guns,” and, in general, tone down contrived
opinions that work against the best interest of both science and the court.  Such
an enlightened resolution was accomplished for a train derailment and massive
toxic spill case that occurred in 1982 in Livingston, Louisiana.59  In this case,
following the filing of a class-action suit by community residents, a Louisiana
court ordered a comprehensive, impartial investigation of community impacts
resulting from the accident.60  As I have noted elsewhere,
it is obvious that the [court] . . . was innovative and effective in the manner that it or-
ganized a resolution to the legal claims of plaintiffs.  Expert testimony was presented
by independent, third-party scientists who collected data utilizing generally accepted
discipline methods.  All reports were completed by the time the trial was scheduled to
start.  Data in the reports were used to negotiate a relatively quick settlement be-
tween the community and [the] I[llinois] C[entral] G[ulf] R[ailroad].  Such an in-
formed and organized legal response to technological disasters and victims of such
events is rare, indeed.61
There are, however, some very real difficulties in this type of resolution for
“high stakes litigation.”  Problems concerning financial support for the ex-
                                                          
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. For a discussion of methodological strategies for protecting confidentiality, see ROBERT F.
BORUCH & JOE S. CECIL, ASSURING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF SOCIAL RESEARCH DATA (1979).
57. Carrington & Jones, supra note 37, at 63-65.
58. Jasanoff, supra note 1, at 106-07, 115-17.
59. J. Steven Picou & Donald D. Rosebrook, Technological Accident, Community Class Action
Litigation, and Scientific Damage Assessment: A Case-Study of Court-Ordered Research, 13 SOC.
SPECTRUM 117, 117-38 (1993).
60. Id.
61. J. Steven Picou, Toxins in the Environment, supra note 4, at 217.
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penses of independent researchers, their availability, time constraints, and the
organization and administration of the independent projects hamper such al-
ternative models for resolving high profile cases.62  Nonetheless, the courts
should give strong consideration to these suggestions.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the conversations be-
tween a licensed social worker and her patient were protected by Rule 501 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.63  The Court held that “the federal privilege,
which clearly applies to psychiatrists and psychologists also extends to confi-
dential communications made to licensed social workers in the course of psy-
chotherapy.”64  Although the protection of data and respondent confidentiality
by survey researchers may not be immediately effected by this ruling, there ap-
pears to be developing case law that might be extended to research conducted
by sociologists and cultural anthropologists.  Given this ruling, and the discus-
sions presented in this volume, the courts seem to have recognized the impor-
tance of the protection of respondent confidentiality and the necessity to pro-
tect a scholar’s right to unpublished, incomplete research records.
Nonetheless, I agree that resisting compelled disclosure will continue to be,
at best, a “tenuous and uncertain” journey for the researcher.65  Legal resolu-
tion will continue to be decided on a case-by-case basis.  Ultimately, it is the re-
searcher who must weigh the ethical and legal consequences of refusing to turn
over data to the court and receiving a jail term for contempt.  I hope this publi-
cation will make a significant contribution to the realization of Traynor’s con-
cluding admonition:  “With common sense and good will in every quarter, there
should be few spectacles of a scholar going to jail  to honor his promise of con-
fidentiality in the interest of useful research.”66
                                                          
62. Maurice Rosenberg, Science in the Courthouse, 16 TECH. IN SOC’Y 1, 5 (1994).
63. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (1996).
64. Id.
65. O’Neil, supra note 35, at 49.
66. Traynor, supra, note 14, at 148.
